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Introduction 
"We are the Borg. You will be assimilated. Resistance is futile."—Star Trek: Voyager 
The cyborg was so named by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in the 1960s to describe their work 
on self-regulating human-machine systems, or cybernetic organisms. Yet beyond its scientific-military 
applications in the sixties, the cyborg finds its lineage rooted firmly in science fiction. The Borg from 
Star Trek, the Terminator, the replicants in Bladerunner, the Six-Million-Dollar Man, exemplify this 
fictional cyborg: “figures in black rubber suits with tubes and wires piercing their faces and torsos” 
(Fuchs, 282). The science fiction cyborg is (or was or aims to be once again) human, the body 
enhanced and the mind manipulated or controlled by technology. It represents humanity’s evolving 
relationship with technology.  
The science fiction cyborg is often such an exaggerated presence, in mind, body, and philosophy, 
serious inquiry into the concept can seem futile. And yet it has been successfully reframed as a 
legitimate model for understanding broader cultural issues, such as reproduction, war, and sexuality. 
Donna Haraway is credited by many scholars for relocating the cyborg in legitimate academic inquiry. 
Her essay, “A Cyborg Manifesto” (first published in the journal Socialist Review in 1985) introduces 
the cyborg as a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality 
as well as a creature of fiction. . . . that changes what counts as women’s experience in the late 
twentieth century” (149).  
Haraway introduced the cyborg as a response to eco, Marxist, socialist, and radical feminist 
efforts to build on dualisms of mind/body, animal/machine, and idealism/materialism when 
approaching issues of science and technology (154). She believed these dualisms inevitably reinforce 
the boundaries of gender, race, labor, and domain, (incorrectly) bolstering ideas of female innocence, 
wholeness, and victimhood more successfully than any patriarchy (160). While Haraway did not deny 
the body as a map “of power and identity,” she saw the cyborg body as an opportunity to move 
beyond the stereotypical (even within feminist studies) boundaries of the female body:   
a cyborg body is not innocent; it was not born in a garden; it does not seek unitary identity and so 
generate antagonistic dualisms without end (or until the world ends); it takes irony for granted. 
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One is too few, and two is only one possibility…The machine is not an it to be animated, 
worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an aspect of our 
embodiment…Cyborgs might consider more seriously the partial, fluid, sometimes aspect of sex 
and sexual embodiment. Gender might not be global identity after all, even if it has profound 
historical breadth and depth. (180) 
For Haraway, the cyborg breaks long established boundaries of gender embodiment, specifically, 
feminine embodiment—that wholeness is the desired state and “skill in mothering and its metaphoric 
extensions” (180) constitutes wholeness. The hybridization of machine and organism upsets the ideal 
of a unitary identity. Instead, to assume the hybrid identity of a cyborg, in Haraway’s treatment, is to 
commit to “partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity” (151), resistance, transgressions, and 
contradictions (154). And in so doing, cyborgs problematize the neat hierarchies associated with 
traditional dualisms (for example the male/female dualism has historically implied a male hierarchy 
and limited gender roles for both male and female), redefining them as the parts of a complete being, 
while at the same time shunning wholeness and unity (see also Hogle). 
After Haraway’s manifesto, the cyborg garnered the attention of scholars from a wide variety of 
academic backgrounds, such as law, social and behavioral sciences, human consciousness, 
medicine, anthropology, agricultural biotechnology, and history (Gray, Figueroa-Sarriera, and Mentor 
478-480). Not surprisingly, the cyborg is a prominent figure in feminist, as well as Marxist, 
multicultural, spiritual, modern, post-modern, humanist, and even Unabomber1 studies. The scholars 
who study the cyborg present it as the next step in human (and machine) evolution (Dyens; Laughlin; 
Warwick; Rothenberg; Baudrillard) or a symbiotic relationship between biological and technological 
(Haraway; Figueroa-Sarriera). For some, the cyborg is a metaphor (Mentor Witches; Hess; Dyens; 
Wajcman). For others, the cyborg is real (Dumit and Davis-Floyd; Warwick; Hogle; Clynes):  
                                          
1 An excerpt from the Unabomer Manifesto, written by Ted Kaczynski: “It is certain that technology is 
creating for human beings a new physical and social environment radically different from the 
spectrum of environments to which natural selection has adapted the human race physically and 
psychologically. If man does not adjust to this new environment by being artificially re-engineered, 
then he will be adapted to it through a long and painful process of natural selection. The former is far 
more likely than the latter” (in Heim 29). 
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Cyborgs do actually exist; about 10% of the current U.S. population are estimated to be cyborgs 
in the technical sense, including people with electronic pacemakers, artificial joints, drug implant 
systems, implanted corneal lenses, and artificial skin. A much higher percentage participates in 
occupations that make them into metaphoric cyborgs, including the computer keyboarder joined 
in a cybernetic circuit with the screen, the neurosurgeon guided by fiber optic microscopy during 
an operation, and the teen gameplayer in the local video arcade. (Hayles Life Cycle 322)  
But in Haraway’s configuration, there is no either/or. As a hybrid, the cyborg is “simultaneously” a 
machine and an organism, “a myth and a tool, a representation and an instrument, a frozen moment 
and a motor of social and imaginative reality” (Haraway in Gray, Mentor, and Figueroa-Sarriera 1).  
Despite all this general attention, the cyborg’s incorporation in communication theory is limited at 
best. One exception is David Gunkel’s article “We Are Borg: Cyborgs and the Subject of 
Communication” published in Communication Theory in 2000. The article questions what the 
hybridization of machine and organism, or cyborg, means “for the concept of the communicative 
subject and the subject matter of communication studies” (332). Gunkel’s premise is that the cyborg 
“comprises a reconfiguration of the subject that not only undermines the concept of human 
subjectivity but also threatens and promises to transform the very subject matter of the study of 
human communication” (333). He asks scholars to consider how the traditional subject privileges “the 
intentional activity of the information source or sender” (341) whereas the cyborg subject supports 
“the social and material conditions by which various subject positions become possible” (346). Gunkel 
concludes that “it is through the paradoxical figure of the cyborg that the subject of communication 
begins to disengage itself from the limited presuppositions and restricted possibilities imposed by the 
traditions of humanism and modern science” (348).  
Gunkel provides the base for many of the ideas I expand upon here, but while he is ultimately 
concerned with the cyborg as figure, I propose it is equally useful when approached as ground2. To 
move from figure to ground requires a re-characterization of the monstrous cyborg figure and a 
communication theory heuristic—Marshall McLuhan’s tetrad. The cyborgian ground that is uncovered 
                                          
2 Think of figure and ground in Gestalt terms.  
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provides the insight into the cyborg perspective from which the foundational issues of communication 
theory: subject, knowledge, reason, reality, authority, understanding, argument, persuasion, meaning, 
objectivity, and agency can be examined. 
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Re-characterizing the cyborg figure 
And what was I? Of my creation and creator I was absolutely ignorant; but I knew that I 
possessed no money, no friends, no kind of property. I was, besides, endued with a figure 
hideously deformed and loathsome; I was not even of the same nature as men. I was more agile 
than they, and could subsist upon coarser diet; I bore the extremes of heat and cold with less 
injury to my frame; my stature far exceeded theirs. When I looked around, I saw and heard of 
none like me. Was I then a monster, a blot upon the earth, from which all men fled, and whom all 
men disowned?—Mary Shelley, Frankenstein 
Clynes and Kline developed the concept of the cyborg for NASA in 1960 in an attempt to name 
the unconscious adaptation of human physiology for space so that the astronauts were “free to 
explore, to create, to think, and to feel” (31). Guided by the demands of space exploration, their aim 
was a creature much like Dr. Frankenstein’s: more agile, able to subsist on a coarser diet, and able to 
bear the extremes of heat and cold thanks to the “biochemical, physiological, and electronic 
modifications of man’s existing modus vivendi” (Clynes and Kline 29). 
At the core of the cyborg is the physical relationship of the human being, mind and body, with 
technology. The physical relationship is the easiest to identify, as it is the basis for both the historical 
Clynes and Kline concept and the ubiquitous science fiction model. The alleged destruction of 
humanity as a result of this physical relationship justifies the cyborg figure as monster designation. 
But the cyborg figure, like Frankenstein’s creature, is not inherently monstrous, is not lacking 
humanity. I locate my argument for a positive assessment of the cyborg figure through its 
characterization in current academic literature. Such assessment allows me to move the discussion 
away from the legitimate, necessary, and yet latently (if not overtly) threatening figure of the cyborg 
and closer to the ground of social reality.  
Narrow/Broad 
Some scholars characterize the cyborg figure narrowly. Charles D. Laughlin laments the 
classification of the cyborg in what he deems the  “sloppy metaphorical sense” (“The cyborg” 293) 
currently popular: 
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The cyborg is rapidly coming to represent virtually every techno-cultural phenomenon no matter 
how distant from the original meaning of the concept: e.g. people on Prozac are cyborgs, people 
wearing eyeglasses are cyborgs, people viewing other people on television destroying buildings 
with smart bombs are cyborgs. The term is now being used to characterize modern reproductive 
technologies (by extension, perhaps men practicing safe-sex become condom cyborgs), the 
sociopolitical implications of the Internet, the entire course of techno-economic development 
since the Second World War, and so on. (Laughlin “Evolution” 145)  
Laughlin disagrees with the wide-range application of the term “cyborg” due to what he perceives as a 
corresponding weakening of its explanatory power—if everything and everyone are cyborgs, what is 
there to talk about (“The cyborg” 146)? His cyborg requires a “process of technical penetration” of the 
body, one that can occur at any of four stages:  
Stage 1) the replacement or augmentation of the human skeleton, such as a wooden leg or false 
teeth; Stage 2) the replacement or augmentation of the muscle, such as a mechanical hand or 
mechanical heart; Stage 3) the replacement or augmentation of parts of the peripheral nervous 
system, autonomic nervous system and the neuroendocrine system, such as bionic arms or 
pacemakers; Stage 4) the replacement or augmentation of parts of the central nervous system, 
such as video eyes for the blind or Air Force cyborg fighter plane control. (“Cyborg 
Consciousness” 152) 
This conception of cyborg, intended to be a reflection of Clynes3 and Kline’s original cybernetic 
organism, limits the characterization to direct penetration of organism by machine. But the 
replacement or augmentation of the human skeleton by a wooden leg, or of the central nervous 
system by video eyes, is experienced by only a very small minority of individuals. The drastic 
                                          
3 In a 1995 interview Manfred Clynes expanded on his original concept, concluding that “homo 
sapiens, when he puts on a pair of glasses, has already changed. When he rides a bicycle he virtually 
has become a cyborg. Initially it’s a little hard to learn to ride a bike but once you learn it you do all of 
these things automatically and the bike becomes almost a part of you. When homo sapiens walks he 
doesn’t pay much attention to how he walks, it’s natural. In the same way, when he is on his bicycle it 
feels natural to the person who knows how to ride a bike. You can call that, if you want, a simple 
cyborg right there” (Gray “Clynes” 49). 
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scenarios implied by Laughlin’s characterization overlooks the more common, everyday experiences 
of common, everyday individuals that function as the hybridization of organism and machine.  
Other scholars interpret the cyborg broadly, including extensions4 that are so present in everyday 
life, so environmental, they are practically invisible:  
People so easily overlook that we’re all sort of cyborg. We wear false teeth or have metal or 
plastic implants in our natural teeth. And clothing. Clothing is so obvious that we don’t see it. All of 
us are cyborgs walking around with synthetic fur, synthetic skin on the bottoms of our feet. Many 
wear lenses in front of their eyes or amplifiers in their ears and in these modern times many 
another artificial but well-functioning part. (Gray “Steele Interview” 69)  
A broad interpretation of the cyborg figure might, initially, seem more exaggerated than productive: 
“They’re everywhere. They’re everything. You can’t escape!” It is a somewhat monstrous proposition. 
But such a comprehensive interpretation of cyborg helps it shed its Terminator image and reflects the 
flexible, variable continuum of relationships between technology and biology. By characterizing the 
cyborg figure broadly, such that familiar extensions such as clothing or corrective eyewear are viewed 
as technologies, the cyborg designation is less threatening to humanity (when has a sweater been 
labeled as deterministic?). This broad characterization also opens the cyborg figure to less concrete 
forms of incorporating organism and machine.  
Concrete/Abstract 
Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid, or DNA, is genetic information, considered by scientists to be the 
“presumed universal substrate of all organic life” (Gunkel 335). The Human Genome Project, in its 
attempt to map out human DNA, has in essence transformed the biological entity into information 
“[the Human Genome Project] considers DNA to be nothing more than a string of information, a 
biologically encoded program that is to be decoded, manipulated, and run on a specific information-
processing machine” (Ibid). While DNA is a concrete chemical substance, it facilitates the abstraction 
of the human being into information. This process of transforming the body into genetic information is 
                                          
4 Extension encompasses Marshall McLuhan’s “extensions of man”— the senses, the central nervous 
system, extended by external tools, like prosthetic devices or cell phones. Extension is also 
“humanity” (Rothenberg 5), or intent, extended (see also Miller).  
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complimented by “postmodern orthodoxy that the body is primarily, if not entirely, a linguistic and 
discursive construction” (Hayles Materiality 147). Thus if the human being, mind and body, can be 
isolated as genetic code, as signifiers, as information, the technological incorporation of the biological 
is made possible: 
Central to the construction of the cyborg are the informational pathways connecting the organic 
body to its prosthetic extensions. This presumes a conception of information as a (disembodied) 
entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-based electronic 
components to make protein and silicon operate as a single system. When information loses its 
body, equating humans and computers is especially easy, for the materiality in which the thinking 
mind is instantiated appears incidental to its essential nature. (Hayles Posthuman 2)5 
The idea of “brains in a vat or somehow downloaded into immortal computers” (Gray, Mentor, and 
Figueroa-Sarriera 7) is, grantedly, a monstrous scenario, one represented in countless B-movie plots, 
nevertheless many scholars find the transformation of the concrete biological entity into abstract 
information to be a key component of the cyborg. As Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin describe it, 
the human being is not disembodied by technology, but is “embodied in a particular mediated form 
(as electronic text, with a return address, a user ID, a signature, and so forth)” (234). The human 
being, mind and body, is sent as information, allowing the cyborg “to reconstruct the meaning of the 
body to almost any desired depth and complexity” (Stone 244; see also Sandoval; see also Fornäs et 
al.). The cyborg, with its newfound mode of abstract being, is able to “commute on electronic 
highways, carry on virtual romances, and work out in brain gyms” (Hess 371). This abstract 
embodiment of a concrete being is not without its dangers, as individuals do not always represent 
themselves honestly, or use the disembodiment to commit illegal acts, such as identity theft or online 
rape (see Lister et al. 169). But it also allows for a freedom from the concrete, an escape from the 
                                          
5 It is important to note that Hayles does not believe consciousness exists outside of the body: “If my 
nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion accessories rather 
than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of 
information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied 
immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that 
understands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we 
depend for our continued survival” (Hayles Posthuman 5).  
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real, that millions of people find so irresistible as to transform themselves into information again and 
again.  
Besides allowing for a deeper level of hybridization between human being and technology, 
characterizing the body as information allows us to begin to question the status of the natural (mind 
and body) as the essence of humanity and that the hybridization of the natural and unnatural is 
monstrous. 
Natural/Unnatural 
The cyborg, like Frankenstein’s creation, is characterized as a monster, “a blot upon the earth,” 
because of its “hideously deformed and loathsome” figure, “The body, while being the real, great 
domestic technology, is represented as the emblem of naturalness. The body has always represented 
the maximum of naturalness; not in itself, but rather represents a historically determined naturalness 
that has the potential to be recreated at any given moment” (Fortunati 72). The hybridization of 
human being and machine destroys naturalness, perverting natural order, 
The chemical or physical inventor is always a Prometheus. There is no great invention, from fire 
to flying, which has not been hailed as an insult to some god. But if every physical and chemical 
invention is a blasphemy, every biological invention is a perversion. There is hardly one which, on 
first being brought to the notice of an observer from any nation which has not previously heard of 
their existence, would not appear to him as indecent and unnatural. (Haldane in Bostrom 4)  
The indecency of hybridization is alluded to in references to codependency of, addiction to, and 
reprogramming involved in the act of destroying the natural (Gray, Mentor, and Figueroa-Sarriera 2; 
Dumit and Davis-Floyd 1). This indecency reaches its apex with Baudrillard’s conclusion that “the 
human body is superfluous” (qtd in Hayles 5). The implication that the unnatural is monstrous is 
unmistakable and it is an implication that “our romanticism for the ‘Whole,’ our desire for the 
transcendent, and our notions of the human” (Hogle 214) drive many assessments of the cyborg. In 
contrast, the categorization of the unnatural as good takes the perspective that:  
life doesn’t have to be organic. No human, divine, or environmental principle requires life to follow 
biological possibilities alone. Chemical compounds are not the exclusive materials of life. Life is a 
10 
 
phenomenon, a dynamic, and, as such, is not tied to matter (as artificial life scientists have 
discovered). Life is an interaction, a thrust, an energy. Life simply uses the forms and material 
that are most useful to it. (Dyens 19) 
The categorization of the unnatural as good recognizes that the hybridized human being and machine 
offers “dangerous possibilities” (Haraway Cyborg Manifesto 154) from which life can thrive.6  
Of course, the cyborg resists such characterization, based on what could easily be considered 
rather simplistic binaries of narrow and broad, concrete and abstract, natural and unnatural—good 
and bad. But such judgments are implied in every assessment of the cyborg. The unnatural, abstract, 
and broad characterizations can be easily understood as representative of a destructive, dangerous, 
exaggerated, and threatening figure. Or they can just as easily be understood as representative of a 
constructive, sound, moderate figure. The latter assessment moves the cyborg figure further from its 
science fiction burden and closer to its theoretical potential. It also begins to hint at the nature of the 
ground, that which defines the figure.  
 
  
  
                                          
6 Even this can be taken to the extreme: “it doesn’t mean everyone has to become a cyborg. If you 
are happy with your state as a human then so be it, you can remain as you are. But be warned—just 
as we humans split from our chimpanzee cousins years ago, so cyborgs will split from humans. 
Those who remain as mere humans are likely to become a sub-species. They will, effectively, be the 
chimpanzees of the future” (Warwick 4). 
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The medium is the message, or, understanding the ground 
Marshall McLuhan offers a communication theory justification for the cyborg as ground. He is 
perhaps best known for his media communication theories and his McLuhanisms such as the global 
village, the extensions of man, and the medium is the message. McLuhan was a controversial figure 
in the 1960s and is still to this day. His work was the subject of several books, including McLuhan: 
Hot & Cool (1967) and McLuhan: Pro & Con (1968), that asked scholars to, essentially, pick a side. 
He has been accused of being “the dupe of new technologies” (Simon 95), “a high priest of Popthink 
who conducts a Black Mass (for dilettantes) before the altar of historical determinism” (Stearn xv), 
and “a kind of bogeyman of technological determinism” (Jeffrey 3). McLuhan also had his supporters, 
including Tom Wolfe, who famously wondered: “suppose he is what he sounds like, the most 
important thinker since Newton, Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and Pavlov—what if he is right” (15)? 
Though his ideas were formed well before many of the cyborg theories discussed here, McLuhan’s 
theories are remarkably transferable and have been “carried forward” by scholars including Harold 
Innis, Eric Havelock, Donald Theall, Neil Postman, Walter Ong, Jean Baudrillard, Umberto Eco, 
Fredric Jameson, and Mark Poster (partial list from Strate 10-11). For modern day scholars, his ideas 
can “help us make sense of our new digital age” (Levinson 1) and he is often referenced in recent 
discourse regarding technology, communication, and cyborgs (Hayles; Laham; Landow; Aerseth; 
Bolter; Gabilondo; Tomas). His theory concerning the medium is particularly useful for examining the 
cyborg, as both are concerned with an incorporation of human consciousness within a technological 
environment.  
  McLuhan’s theory, summarized (in part) by “the medium is the message” states that “any 
invention or technology is an extension or self-amputation of our physical bodies, and such extension 
also demands new ratios or new equilibriums among the other organs and extensions of the body” 
(McLuhan Understanding Media 45). So the telephone is the extension of the ear, or money is an 
extension of the hand7. These extensions allow humans to “increase power and speed” 
                                          
7 “In the beginning, its function of extending the grasp of men from their nearest staples and 
commodities to more distant ones is very slight. Increased mobility of grasp and trading is small at 
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(Understanding Media 90) of the senses through specialization and fragmentation, such as the wheel, 
as extension of foot, allows the speed-up of movement. Yet in order for the central nervous system to 
bear this amputation, fragmentation, and subsequent speed-up, it must numb itself and as a result 
“self-amputation forbids self-recognition” (Understanding Media 43)—humans are unable to see the 
effects of the medium on the central nervous system. The use of extensions becomes unconscious, 
just as Clynes and Kline envisioned the cyborg functioning.  
McLuhan’s medium is “a milieu—medium in the sense of growing medium for plants” (E. 
McLuhan qtd in Benedetti and DeHart 126). This growing medium constitutes a setting so 
environmental (McLuhan and Fiore 68) that the individual cannot separate himself/herself from it: 
“man remains as unaware of the psychic and social effects of his new technology as a fish of the 
water it swims in” (McLuhan qtd in Norden 237). Kenneth Burke compares this dialectic between 
environment (what Burke terms scene) and individual (what Burke terms agent) to the paintings of the 
pointillist Seurat,” which “carry the sense of consistency between scene and agent to such lengths 
that his human figures seem on the point of dissolving into their background” (“Grammar” 1306).  
The medium as environment is further developed with McLuhan and Power’s conception of 
figure, or “area of attention,” and ground, or “very much larger area of inattention” (5).  The medium is 
the ground8 that defines the “scale and form of human association and action” (McLuhan 
Understanding Media 9). Because the ground defines the figure, we do not notice the ground. Or in 
the case of the Seurat example, we make every attempt to distance (numb) ourselves until the figure 
is at last distinct. Furthermore there is, much like the Seurat example, no definitive line separating 
figure and ground: 
All situations comprise an area of attention (figure) and a very much larger area of inattention 
(ground). The two continually coerce and play with each other across a common outline or 
boundary or interval that serves to define both simultaneously. The shape of one conforms 
                                                                                                                                
first. . . Trading by currency is based on the principle of grasping and letting go in an oscillating cycle” 
(McLuhan Understanding Media 132).  
 
8Consider also that ground, as soil, is the ultimate “growing medium.”  
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exactly to the shape of the other. Figures rise out of, and recede back into, ground, which is con-
figurational and comprises all other available figures at once. (McLuhan and McLuhan Laws of 
Media 5) 
Lance Strate takes this concept one step further, arguing that figure and ground are 
interchangeable, “technology is the content and biology is the medium. Technology is produced by 
the biological, extends the biological, and also acts on the biological. Of course, technology as a 
medium itself can in turn use the biological as its content” (31). Once again we return to transgressed 
boundaries: figure becomes ground, ground becomes figure, either way, without one the other does 
not exist.  
The effects of the medium, according to McLuhan, are all-encompassing, for “all technology has 
the property of the Midas touch; whenever a society develops an extension of itself, all other functions 
of that society tend to be transmuted to accommodate that new form; once any new technology 
penetrates a society, it saturates every institution of that society. New technology is thus a 
revolutionizing agent” (McLuhan qtd in Norden 239; see also Miller “Technology as a Form” 229). The 
problem: as society is shaped by the medium, so is consciousness, for “it is the medium that shapes 
and controls the scale and form of human association and action. The content or uses of such media 
are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human association” (McLuhan 
Understanding Media 9; see also McLuhan and Fiore 8).   
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that society is concerned more with the effects of the 
content, over the effects of the medium, an example of how pervasive the narcosis is: “for the 
‘content’ of a medium is like the juicy piece of meat carried by the burglar to distract the watchdog of 
the mind” (McLuhan Understanding Media 18). McLuhan’s solution to this problem is overcoming the 
narcosis, or awareness, “for any medium has the power of imposing its own assumptions on the 
unwary. Prediction and control consist in avoiding this subliminal state of Narcissus trance” 
(Understanding Media 15). But because humanity is numbed to the extensions, it is numbed to the 
effects.  
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And yet McLuhan believed there was one individual in particular who was more capable than 
others of avoiding the subliminal state—the artist: “the effects of technology do not occur at the level 
of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any 
resistance. The serious artist is the only person able to encounter technology with impunity, just 
because he is an expert aware of the changes in sense perception” (Understanding Media 18).  For 
example, much of the current cyborg discourse includes some (or is based entirely on) analysis of the 
themes in cyborg art, literature, film, comic books, television, and video games (for a comprehensive 
list, see the bibliography of The Cyborg Handbook, edited by Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-
Sarriera, and Steven Mentor). The Terminator, Blade Runner, and Star Trek: The Next Generation 
(Casper; Dyens; Edwards; Fuchs; Goldberg; Haraway; Hayles; Hess; Hogle; Macauley and Gordo-
López) all figure prominently in scholarly work, as does William Gibson’s novel Neuromancer (Dyens; 
Edwards; Gray and Mentor; Gusterson; Hogle; Macauley and Gordo-López; Sandoval; Warwick).  
The cyberpunk artists, “being hybrids themselves” (Dyens 73), see the ground, they have begun 
to recognize patterns, most significantly with regard to promise, invasion, ambiguity, and loss of 
humanity (Oehlert 226; Dyens 73). However, if one is not an artist, McLuhan offers a heuristic that will 
force the ground into the area of attention: the tetrad.  
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Tetradic analysis of cyborg 
The cyborg is the medium, the ground. But how does one comprehend the cyborg and, following 
McLuhan’s logic, the message? The tetrad is McLuhan’s “practical means” of understanding media, a 
heuristic to make visible the invisible, by bringing the ground into focus and forcing comparison with 
the figure. “In tetrad form, the artefact is seen to be not neutral or passive,” McLuhan explains, “but an 
active logos or utterance of the human mind or body that transforms the user and his ground” (Laws 
of Media 99). Likewise, in tetrad form the cyborg can be understood to be an active utterance of the 
human being and technology.  
McLuhan’s tetrad is useful as a starting point for understanding the cyborg perspective because it 
is simply that, a starting point, or in McLuhan’s words, a probe. McLuhan’s own application of the 
tetrad reveals alternate versions (aptly subtitled “this version” and “that version”), chains, loops, and 
clusters of analysis. The tetrad is meant to introduce discussion, not conclude it. For the purposes of 
introducing the cyborg to communication theory, it seems a fitting tool. 
 The cyborg is not merely the mechanization of the human being, it is the dynamic transgression 
of boundaries—figure and ground, mind and body, biology and technology “continually modifying 
each other” (McLuhan and McLuhan Laws of Media 18). The tetrad facilitates the initial discussion of 
the cyborg perspective by seeking the responses to four questions:  
1. What does any artifact enlarge or enhance;  
2. What does it erode or obsolesce;  
3. What does it retrieve that had been earlier obsolesced;  
4. What does it reverse or flip into when pushed to the limits of its potential? (McLuhan and 
Powers 9) 
 A key factor in McLuhan’s tetrad is simultaneity. The four processes, enlargement/enhancement, 
erosion/obsolescence, retrieval, and reversal, are in no way rigid or linear. Instead, the form of the 
tetrad reflects the continuum of transgressed boundaries, the hybridization that characterizes both 
McLuhan’s conception of medium and more recent scholarly definitions of the cyborg. This is 
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expressed visually by placing the responses in contrast to one another in a grid, and while the grid9 
cannot adequately reflect the looping or resonating between the elements of the tetrad that McLuhan 
intended, it can suggest multiple comparisons. The following tetradic analyses10 of a refrigerator and 
a satellite exemplify how this process brings the ground into view:  
Refrigerator (Laws of Media 139)  
1. Enlarges/enhances: availability of 
wider range of foods 
4. Reverses: Homogeneity of flavour and 
texture 
3. Retrieves: leisure of cook and provider 
(storage) 
2. Erodes/obsolesces: dried food, salted, 
spiced (the taste of fresh food) 
 
Satellite (Laws of Media 150-151) 
1. Enlarges/enhances: the planet 4. Reverses: implosion (population 
reverses from content/spectator to 
actor/participant) 
3. Retrieves: ecology 2. Erodes/obsolesces: Nature 
(programmed environments) 
 
The analyses of the refrigerator and satellite move the focus away from the uses of these particular 
technologies and toward the impact of the satellite and refrigerator within the medium. Examined 
through the tetrad, the refrigerator does not just preserve food, it impacts the production, 
transportation, and consumption of food. It affects how time is perceived and how tastes develop. The 
satellite is more than a giant orbiting transmitter. It retrieves ecology, by creating a greater awareness 
of (and tenderness for) the “blue planet” by supplying information from a new perspective—space. At 
the same time the satellite obsolesces Nature through its very existence as a man-made celestial 
body, a programmed environment that has the ability to sustain human life. The distinctions McLuhan 
                                          
9 The grids I present are laid out as McLuhan laid out his grid, with no apparent logic or pattern that 
links the grid to the numbered questions that guide the analysis. But again, his tetrad represented the 
looping and resonating that exists between the elements of the ground.  
 
10 McLuhan believed the tetrad had applications beyond what is conventionally considered to be 
media, as evidenced by his application of the tetrad to the Copernican Revolution (Laws of Media 
184-185).   
1. Enlarges/enhances: role of the sun as 
central 
4. Reverses: relativity (center and 
margins) 
3. Retrieves: Aristarchus (sun-centered) 2. Erodes/obsolesces: the earth 
 
17 
 
makes between the retrieval of ecology and the obsolescence of Nature seem almost contradictory, 
but it is in keeping with the dynamic nature of the medium. The contradictions more clearly reflect the 
transgressed boundaries of the medium—there is no clear line between enhancement and 
obsolescence, retrieval and reversal.   
By applying the tetrad to the cyborg we begin to move away from our focus on the figure, the 
physical relationship between human being and technology, and the binaries that define it, to a focus 
on the ground, the medium and its message.  
Cyborg 
 
1. Enlarges/enhances: (inhuman) growth 4. Reverses: noise 
3. Retrieves: equilibrium 2. Erodes/obsolesces: binary logic 
 
1. Enlarges/enhances (inhuman) growth 
The cyborg enhances (inhuman) growth. This analysis returns us to both the original conception of 
the cyborg and to McLuhan’s development of the medium. The growth enhanced by the cyborg is 
both physical and mental/informational, and is experienced by both the medium and the human 
being, due to the constant interaction. The cyborg is the realization of McLuhan’s concept of medium 
as ground or environment, the ultimate growing medium. It also brings with it the idea of relinquishing 
control to other entities in order to facilitate growth. The growth is enhanced by the parts working 
together to achieve what each cannot (or will not) on their own: 
Protists like M. paradoxa seem to show in mid-stream the ubiquitous, life-changing association of 
events that brought motile, oxygen-using, or photosynthetic bacteria into other cells, perhaps 
originally on an opportunistic hunt for a nutritious meal or a secure medium for their metabolic 
transactions. Some predators settled down inside their prey and struck up quite an energy and 
information-exchange economy. . . “With the elapse of time, the internal enemies of the prey 
evolved into microbial guests, and, finally, supportive adopted relatives. (Haraway Cyborgs and 
Symbionts xviii). 
Haraway’s example reflects the fears of the unwilling host, or prey, in current discussions of the 
cyborg. It also brings to light that the exchange required for growth is not always deliberate or 
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conscious, but neither is it “unnatural.” As with the protists, the whole of the cyborg is a medium for 
growth for all of its individual parts.  
 The analysis that the cyborg enhances growth also reflects the original intention of the cyborg. 
For Clynes and Kline, the incorporation of “exogenous components” in order to create a self-
regulating organism was not only for the purposes of space exploration. Their belief was that the 
cyborg would free the human element from the tedium of controlling its environment and therefore 
allow for greater “spiritual exploration,” (23) and intellectual and personal growth:  
Man’s exploration of space has been successful from the technical point of view during the last 
decade, but his emotional exploration of his new experience and environment have not been 
spectacular. It may be too much to expect astronauts to provide us with a fully communicated 
view of their new enlarged experience: the exigencies of piloting their vehicles necessarily make 
great demands on them: so we must be satisfied with the language of ‘wows’ and ‘man-oh-man’ 
and similar expletives, whose implications we can only guess at from their contexts on good old 
earth. (Clynes 36) 
More recent cyborg scholars have expanded on this idea of emotional and intellectual freedom, 
claiming that thinking, freed from the burdens of current ideologies, such as objectivity and 
individualism, will be restored to “its radical uselessness” (Baudrillard Impossible Exchange 111; see 
also Haraway; see also Gunkel).   
The cyborg is freed from objectivity by complicating existence. The question “what is reality,” so 
complex as to remain the subject of debate for several thousand years is now complicated by virtual 
reality and hyperreality. The cyborg is freed from individualism by incorporating not only the human 
and technological perspectives, but the perspectives of other cyborg minds, present as a part of the 
medium, as well. The result, pattern seeking for its own sake, creates radical uselessness of thought. 
And it is through this radical uselessness, coupled with the freedom from the tedium of controlling its 
environment (as Clynes and Kline intended), that the cyborg experiences inhuman growth. The 
metamorphosis of Gregor Samsa in Franz Kafka’s novella The Metamorphosis exemplifies inhuman 
growth: 
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The metamorphosis that Gregor endures (invokes?), as will be the case for numerous cyberpunk 
characters of this late-twentieth-century genre, is therefore a way for him to retreat into different 
representational realms, where the repressive forces of a ‘normal’ world cannot exist. The more 
Gregor is transformed, the less he needs to think about human problems. The more Gregor is 
transformed, the farther away he gets from humanity, and the more he frees himself from any 
human demands. His inhumanity is his freedom. (Dyens 61) 
The cyborg is inhuman, in large part, because it erodes binary logic. The mutual incorporation of 
human being and machine involves the breaking down of boundaries that, up until this point, were 
understood to be permanent, unquestionable.  
2. Erodes/obsolesces binary logic 
Viewed through binary logic, the boundaries between biological and technological, natural and 
artificial, human and machine, animate and inanimate, thought and process, autonomous and 
automated, real and virtual, constitute “one of the cornerstones of Western thought” (Gunkel and Dery 
qtd in Gunkel 335-336; see also Eglash; see also Fuchs; see also McLuhan). Splitting and 
separating, as a means of control, dominates Western military, economic, political, industrial, and 
linguistic logic: divide and conquer. Binary logic is “an opposition of two terms where the difference 
between the terms is thought to tell us something about each of them. So, what is to be ‘feminine’ 
gains some meaning by not being ‘masculine,’ and what it is to be ‘strong’ gains meaning if we know 
what ‘weak’ means” (Lister et al. 295). What is human gains meaning by not being machine, what is 
biological gains meaning by not being technological, what is real gains meaning by not being virtual, 
and so on. Historically, binary logic has imposed a hierarchy within the oppositional terms, along lines 
of power and control, understood in terms of self and other. That which is “not the self” is used to 
define the other: animal is “not human,” woman is “not man,” and so forth.  
But the cyborg doesn’t respect the boundaries of binary logic. The boundaries are transgressed, 
blurred, leaving in their place hybrids:  
the virtual hand does not merely act as a prosthesis or replacement for the physical object, but, 
rather, it intensifies corporeality in the form of a ‘technophilic body.’ This process of hybridization 
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(i.e., the synthesis of human agency and technology) is the latest manifestation of cyborg 
agencies. Cyberspace is an experiential medium in which the transgression of epistemological 
and psychological boundaries is commonplace; categories such as object/subject, 
perception/action, and human/computer become somewhat unreliable when applied to 
experiences in cyberspace. The blurring of boundaries between humans and machines has 
allowed the emergence of hybrid positions.  (Macauley & Gordo-López 436) 
In the above example, the body (and intent) is transformed into information, is incorporated into the 
technological entity (in this case, cyberspace), is embodied in a mediated form (the virtual hand), 
responds to feedback from the technological entity, and thus extends its physical being. The example 
is the transgression of multiple binaries/boundaries, including human and machine, thought and 
process, real and virtual. 
If the only way to be “whole” is to maintain the distinctions between human and machine, natural 
and unnatural, good and bad, then “it is, therefore, a devious monstrosity that not only challenges the 
boundaries that had differentiated the human form from the animal and the animal from the machine 
but also intentionally deforms the structure of all binary oppositions that construct and sustain 
Western epistemologies” (Gunkel 348). It is not, however, that the boundaries are altogether absent 
because the cyborg retrieves equilibrium.  
3. Retrieves equilibrium 
In the most basic sense, the cyborg retrieves equilibrium through its restorative and normalizing 
functions (Gray, Mentor, and Figuero-Sarriera 3; see also Hogle). The cyborg has the ability to 
counter poor eyesight with corrective lenses or repair a faulty heart with plastic valves. These new 
technologies, once introduced, require still more equilibriums be developed (McLuhan): the 
equilibrium that the nose, ears, and temple must develop, for example, with the frame that holds the 
corrective lenses, or the equilibrium the body’s immune system must develop with the plastic 
hardware now functioning as a heart.  
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In another sense, equilibrium is the result of antagonistic pairs, or “fixed oppositions,” 
counteracting one another to ensure “the stability and dialectical movement of the whole” (Baudrillard 
Impossible Exchange 6). Consider the following example: 
’for each muscle moving a limb one way, there is at least one other moving it in the opposite 
direction. The biceps which flexes our arm is counteracted or antagonized by the triceps, which 
extends or straightens it. Sherrington worked out the remarkable coordination between such 
antagonistic pairs of flexor and extensor muscles. They receive on every occasion exactly 
opposite commands from the command center. When one is made to contract by proprioceptive 
reflex, its antagonist is made to reflex simultaneously.’ (Lowenstein qtd in McLuhan and Fiore 
War and Peace 55) 
Feedback requires binaries. Communication within the medium, between technology and biology, 
exists as feedback between a series of fixed oppositions—on and off, 0 and 1. Additionally, the 
cyborg, human being and machine in fixed opposition, recovers balance:  
The real divested of the anti-real becomes hyperreal, more real than the real, and vanishes into 
simulation. Matter divested of anti-matter is doomed to entropy. By elimination of the void, it is 
condemned to gravitational collapse. The subject deprived of all otherness collapses into itself, 
and sinks into autism. The elimination of the inhuman causes the human to collapse into odium 
and ridicule. (Baudrillard Impossible Exchange 12) 
 “The cyborg establishes difference” (Goldberg 246) and then transgresses it: 
Borders and transgressions are mutually dependent on each other. Only by crossing a border, at 
least in thought, can it be experienced as such. Ethic norms or group identities are regularly 
reinforced by discourses on that which is beyond the limit, on the ‘other(s).’ Conversely, crossings 
are only possible if there are borders to cross. For transgressions and hybrids to have any 
meaning and value, they must contradict established limits and bridge that which is otherwise 
separated. (Fornäs et al. 1) 
The cyborg transgresses and blurs the boundaries between machine and organism but requires they 
exist nonetheless. While equilibrium requires the presence of boundaries, the hierarchies inherent in 
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binary logic remain eroded because of the fluidity of those boundaries. This fluidity, however 
necessary for maintaining the equilibrium of the whole, creates noise.  
4. Reverses noise 
The cyborg reverses noise. The postmodern construction of the body as rhetoric, as “thinking 
matter,” designates existence to the plane of consciousness: 
We exist in order to inseminate this planet with representations, ideas, and culture, with 
conscious and thinking dynamics. This is the essence, the meaning of our existence. We are 
much more than simple masses of genes: We are also containers of representations, colonies of 
ideas, and systems of thought. (Dyens 6) 
While the representations, ideas, and thoughts are often seen as socially constructed, the 
insemination is frequently viewed as the domain of the individual. Thus the inseminators of 
representations, ideas, and thoughts seek language that comes as close to “Mathematical 
plainness11” (Lanham Economics 138) as possible, implying control and authority through clarity. 
Mathematical plainness is the requisite form of machine communication as well: 0 and 1. In Claude E. 
Shannon and Warren Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication noise is what must be 
overcome in order to ensure mathematical plainness. Noise, in Shannon and Weaver’s model, is the 
cause of confusion, of message break-down. But the cyborg, very much a container of 
representations, colony of ideas, and system of thought, sees potential in noise, in convoluting 
representations, in confusing signifiers, in disrupting patterns. 
In Haraway’s theory the cyborg “insists on noise,” (“Cyborg Manifesto” 176) calling attention to 
the boundaries it disrupts and the hierarchies it diminishes. McLuhan also reverses the historically 
negative understanding of noise. For McLuhan, noise, the unintentional signals, is part of the 
medium, “all the side-effects, all the unintended patterns and changes” (Cavell 168). The medium is 
the message, “hence, communication is not simply a matter of intentionality, which assumes an 
                                          
11 A “theory of communication that has dominated our thinking to the present day. . . The truth, like 
Adam and Eve before the Fall, is naturally naked. And the heart that delivers it should always be 
naked as well. These assumptions are so fundamental to how we think about communication that 
they inhere in the terminology we use to describe it: rhetoric versus reality; style versus substance” 
(Lanham Economics 138; see also Gunkel).  
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individual and solipsistic subject that then decides to communicate. Rather, it consists of a complex of 
unintentional signals that are always and already circulating throughout a particular social network” 
(Gunkel 343).  
The cyborg creates noise—it destroys the individual through hybridization. The resulting side-
effects disrupt the patterns that individuals use to understand and communicate the world around 
them. But “if pattern is the realization of a certain set of possibilities,” then “randomness is the much, 
much larger set of everything else, from phenomena that cannot be rendered coherent by a given 
system’s organization to those the system cannot perceive at all” (Hayles Posthuman 286) and it is 
the “much, much larger set of everything else” the cyborg seeks. In challenging hierarchies, retrieving 
equilibrium, and freeing itself from the burdens of humanity the cyborg opens itself to the much, much 
larger set of representations, ideas, and thought and all the “dangerous possibilities” (Haraway 
“Cyborg Manifesto” 154) that lie within.  
The cyborgian ground, as revealed by McLuhan’s tetrad, is enhanced growth, eroded binary 
logic, retrieved equilibrium, and reversed noise. This ground, or the “very much larger area of 
inattention” (McLuhan and Power 5), defines the scale and form of cyborg association and action (see 
McLuhan Understanding Media 9). 
The following examples apply the cyborgian ground to analyses of communication media that are 
“the extensions of man,” the machine half of the cyborg. The presence of the human half, however, is 
implicit. These analyses further locate the cyborg in communication theory and introduce how this 
ground can be used to understand the cyborg perspective. 
Cell phone 
1. Enlarge/enhances: growth 
(conversation as companion) 
4. Reverses: noise (the unintended 
patterns of background conversation, text 
messaging) 
3. Retrieves: equilibrium (recovers 
public/private) 
2. Erodes/obsolesces: binary logic 
(public/private, print/oral) 
 
The cell phone is one of the most visible figures in the cyborgian ground and thus a logical 
starting point for analysis. The cell phone enhances growth as all communication media enhance 
growth, by extending the senses and diminishing the boundaries of time and space. The text 
messaging function of the cell phone disrupts the boundaries of print and orality, transforming a 
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device that has been typically understood as a vehicle for oral communication into a vehicle for both 
oral and print communication.  
And where the telephone extends the ear and the voice, the cell phone extends the conversation. 
Where once the individual called from home or office (or occasionally, the phone booth) but walked, 
rode, waited, ate, or otherwise conducted their daily lives without the ubiquitous presence of a 
telephone, now there is a constant companion, instant access to conversation. The fixity of traditional 
phone technology encouraged purposeful conversation, calls initiated for a specific reason. The 
accessibility of the cell phone necessarily changes the communicative aims of individuals, and 
conversation becomes a tool to ward off loneliness or to pass time. The message is often “I didn’t 
really have anything important to say,” adapting radical uselessness to the conversation, or 
conversation for conversation’s sake.  
This constant conversation erodes the public/private dynamic. Phone conversations very literally 
taking place in the public domain in grocery stores, on the sidewalk, in restaurants, in theatres (during 
plays and movies!). And topics of conversation that were once considered the sphere of the private, 
like negotiating the complicated territory of personal relationship, are now public.  
At the same time, the cell phone recovers the public through community and the private through 
greater intimacy. The cell phone recovers community in communities of practice for users and 
nonusers. Though ever decreasing in number, the individuals who elect not to use cell phones think 
of the technology, and the conversations that result, very differently than those individuals who do, 
especially in terms of the usefulness and intrusiveness. Individuals who use their cell phone to send 
text messages also recover community, complete with a language (txt language employs ‘r’ for ‘are’ 
or ‘b4’ for ‘before’) that generates “normative communicative behaviors that make interaction work as 
smoothly as possible” (Lister et al. 175). Furthermore, the cell phone recovers a time when people 
shared phone lines with the community—the partyline. Partyline technology allowed members of a 
community access to the personal conversations of all other members of the community. This access 
forced individuals to either modify their conversation or open their private lives up to the community. 
Though the comparison is only partial, as partylines allowed listeners access to both sides of the 
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conversation, the public nature of partyline, and subsequently the cell phone, requires participants to 
balance the usefulness of the technology with the openness of the conversation. And while cell phone 
conversations are becoming more public, their frequency and immediacy facilitates greater intimacy. 
Though family and friends are more dispersed geographically (in Western societies) they are also 
more available.  
Finally, the cell phone reverses noise, due to the community involvement in the conversation. 
This involvement is often not intentional, but the presence of the community, even as background 
noise, changes the conversation. And the public nature of many private conversations reveals 
unintended patterns of communication for the conversant who, perhaps, modifies his or her speech 
because of the presence of others. This modification may require more effort on the part of the 
recipient to fill in the blanks of the conversation, or to develop some sort of coded speech (“If your 
boss is there, say ‘chicken.’”), or to delay the conversation until a more private setting can be found.  
The text messaging function of the cell phone reverses noise literally, as it is, for the most part, a 
silent form of communication. Yet the text itself reverses noise, introducing new signifiers, or txt 
language, such as lol (laugh out loud), u (you), r (are), b (be), c (see), 4 (for), 2 (to, too), l8r (later), b4 
(before), -oz- (-orr-, such that ‘soz’ = ‘sorry’), and btwn (between). This language makes easier the 
somewhat tedious process of “typing” via scrolling through the keypad for letters.  The omission of 
punctuation, vowels, articles, and grammar considered to be extraneous creates new patterns based 
on old signifiers, but meaning is still conveyed. The predictive text software function of cell phones, 
where the phone participates in the conversation by filling in partial words12, also reverses noise. This 
function increases the potential for unintended patterns (“Pls pick up clock fr dryclnrs”), should the 
user not pay close enough attention and accept the incorrect word as suggested by the cell phone.  
From a cyborg perspective the cell phone is more than a highly portable reincarnation of the 
telephone and social networking and dating websites are more than an online incarnation of the bar.  
                                          
12 So while typing c-l-o, the phone may choose to add s-e, u-d, n-e, c-k, or t-h-e-s to spell close, 
cloud, clone, clock, or clothes, based on its interpretation of the previous text.  
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Social Networking and Dating Websites 
1. Enlarges/enhances: growth 
(communicating self) 
4. Reverses: noise (mosaic) 
3. Retrieves: equilibrium 
(confinement/expansion, 
isolation/inclusion) 
2. Erodes/obsolesces: binary logic 
(real/virtual) 
 
The social networking (MySpace, Friendster, Facebook13) and dating websites (Match, 
eHarmony, AmericanSingles) enhance growth just as the protists enhance cellular growth as 
“supportive adoptive relatives” (Haraway Cyborgs and Symbionts xviii). Here, the social networking 
and dating websites facilitate the propagation of the human species, helping individuals expand their 
clan, or support network, and even attract a mate. Participants present themselves as an 
amalgamation of textual, visual, audio, and video signifiers. In some cases, the participants complete 
a personality profile, which a computer program analyzes and then matches with individuals it feels 
compliments the given profile. In addition to the popularity of these sites for networking, their apparent 
success in bringing strangers together in permanent relationships supports the characterization as 
adoptive relatives, fulfilling the match-making role that family members once held (Herbold email).  
Such popularity and success is also a testament to the ease with which the human being can 
communicate the self in a mediated environment.  
These social networking and dating websites also erode the binary logic of real and virtual. 
Participants use the forum to create a representation of their “real” self (sometimes more “real” than 
“actual”) in multiple mediated forms (primarily textual and visual, though increasingly including audio 
and video components). This format allows individuals to create or recreate their true selves, perhaps 
redefining their gender, or background, or personality, blurring the boundaries of real and virtual. 
Moreover, if, according to the hierarchies imposed by binary logic, virtual is “not real” and therefore 
less desirable, then virtual interactions and virtual relationships are less desirable than real interaction 
and real relationships. And yet the virtual relationships, conducted primarily through mediated (and 
often text-based—email, chatting, blogs, blog comments, etc.) interactions, are seen to be as 
                                          
13 These social networking sites extend beyond purely human relationships. Please refer to Dogster, 
Catster, and Petster for examples of social networking around real pets in virtual form.  
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meaningful as real relationships. Indeed, individuals will often transfer previously established “real” 
relationships into the mediated environment of social networking websites.  
The social networking and dating websites retrieve equilibrium. In order to participate, the 
individual must necessarily confine and isolate herself, yet her virtual experience is far from confined 
or isolated. The boundaries of the screen defines, very literally, the virtual self, limiting the form of the 
virtual to a 12"x14" section of real space. Similarly, the real self is confined by space and time. And 
anyone who has tried to physically share a computer quickly comes to realize that it is a tool of the 
individual and encourages a one-to-one interaction ratio. Yet within the virtual space of the social 
networking and dating websites, expansion of the virtual self is presumed to be limitless. The isolation 
encouraged by the technology is balanced by the inclusion of the websites. Within these virtual 
spaces, the virtual self is no longer isolated, but can interact with hundreds of thousands of 
individuals, all with the potential to develop into more meaningful relationships. The isolation of 
geography14 is also less of a factor, as the technology provides individuals from different corners of 
the world a (virtual) space to meet.  
Lastly, the social networking and dating websites reverse noise. The virtual self is not literally text 
and graphics, but a combination of zeros and ones, a language that is pure noise to the majority of 
individuals who have a virtual self. Programmers code the zeros and ones into functions (save, print, 
cut, paste, close, minimize, send, etc.), oftentimes represented as icons that make up part of the 
interactive mosaic that is the interface. Within the interface, participants use the functions to create 
their own mosaic. The incorporation of multiple genres of communication has fragmented the genres. 
The virtual self is not entirely textual, or visual, or audio, or video, but a reconfiguration of the 
fragments into a new pattern, a much larger set of possibilities (Hayles and Haraway) for the human 
being.  
The tetradic analyses of the cell phone and social networking and dating websites, like the 
refrigerator and satellite before them, move the focus away from the uses of these particular 
technologies and toward their impact within the medium. The cyborgian ground suggests a new 
                                          
14 That said, the infrastructure that supports new technology is affected by geography and thus is a 
limiting factor on unlimited global access. 
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perspective, the cyborg perspective, that embraces contradiction (erodes binary logic and retrieves 
equilibrium), confusion (reverses noise), and uselessness (enhances inhuman growth), consequently 
foretelling a new direction for the foundational issues of communication theory.  
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Implications/Conclusions 
The cyborg has limited presence in communication theory. Instead, scholars have focused their 
attention more on the traditional issues of communication translated by digital technologies, “what 
happens when text moves from page to screen” (Lanham 31), or from page to email, website, 
chatroom, blog, etc. Digital communication theory retains fundamental concerns of knowledge, 
reason, reality, authority, understanding, argument, persuasion, meaning, objectivity, and agency, 
while focusing on issues of nonlinearity, hypertextuality, interactivity, hypermediacy, immediacy, and 
remediation.  These discourses often find analogies in print, for example, comparing MUDs and 
MOOs (Multi-User Domain and Multi-User Domain Object-Oriented) to “the traditional 19th- or 20th-
century novel” and its emphasis on “the definition and maturation of character” (Bolter 199). More 
common comparisons include: the Internet to a library, electronic text to a codex, email to letters and 
the telegraph, and so forth.  
To be sure, even with the focus on “what happens when text moves from page to screen” the 
transgressed boundaries that are central to Haraway’s cyborg are not without mention in current 
communication discourse. But the historical boundary between author and reader, and the 
hierarchies of authority, meaning, and control that it defines, is at issue in digital communication:    
hypertext writers have shown how the electronic medium can accommodate a different 
relationship between author and reader. No longer an intimidating figure, an electronic author 
assumes the role of a craftsperson, working with prescribed materials and goals. She works 
within the limitations of a computer system, and she imposes further limitations upon her readers. 
Within those limits, however, her reader is free to move. If in print the subjectivity of the author 
was expressed at the expense of that of the reader, in electronic hypertext two subjectivities, the 
author’s and the reader’s, encounter one another on more nearly equal terms. The reader may 
well become the author’s adversary, seeking to make the text over in a direction that the author 
did not anticipate. (Bolter 168; see also Lister et al. 40-41) 
Similar arguments have been made for email, and the difficulty of establishing authority when original 
messages can be modified and sent out again (Lister et al. 19).  
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The cyborg is more than digital communication, more than moving text from page to screen. The 
cyborg exists “in terms of communication” (Gunkel 342)—the medium is the message:  
Writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs, etched surfaces of the late twentieth century. 
Cyborg politics is the struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication, 
against the one code that translates all meaning perfectly, the central dogma of phallogocentrism. 
That is why cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, rejoicing in the illegitimate 
fusions of animal and machine. (Haraway 176) 
The cyborg is the hybridization of the machine and the organism through physical and rhetorical 
penetration. Though biology and technology “have traditionally been considered primarily the domain 
of the real” (Payne) the hybridization of the two realities results in the virtual, simultaneously unreal 
and more than real. The cyborg floats “suspended between points of objectivity, being constituted and 
reconstituted in different configurations in relation to the discursive arrangement of the occasion” 
(Gunkel 345). The different configurations open the cyborg perspective to the opportunity of 
(inhuman) growth, the breakdown of binaries, the support of equilibrium, and the possibility of noise. 
Thus the fundamental issues of communications theory all merit reexamination through the cyborg 
perspective: How can we explain the rhetorical force of the cyborg? What are the implications of 
inhumanity on communications? If thought is radically useless, is it also pointless? If the cyborg 
abolishes hierarchies, how do we determine issues of ethics? Neutrality in communication has been 
unachievable since the inception of language and even if it were achievable, is it desirable? Is 
equilibrium a new form of persuasion? How can we understand randomness without patterns? Is the 
ultimate goal of the transgressed boundaries a universal reality? Do the blurring of boundaries inhibit 
argument and thus limit growth?  
 For example, one of Clynes and Kline’s goals for the cyborg was to allow astronauts the freedom 
to focus on their “new enlarged experience” (Gray “Clynes” 36). But as Chris Hables Gray, Heidi J. 
Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor point out, the new enlarged experience of the cyborg may be 
beyond our capability of expression: 
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If every important part of human life—birth, education, sex, work, aging, death—is transformed by 
intimate connections with technologies, then the language of technology will begin to ‘invade’ the 
ways we express and perceive these experiences. Just as Frankenstein’s monster. . . struggled 
to learn to speak as humans, we ‘humans’ will struggle to speak as cyborgs, to find the words to 
express very new experiences. (6) 
To this point, the example of Kevin Warwick, professor of cybernetics at Reading University in 
Reading, U.K., who has implanted sensors in his arm that allow him to directly interface his nervous 
system to computers in an effort to attain a non-human sense. Here he describes his first interface: 
“To describe what I actually felt inside is almost impossible. There was no question of my brain taking 
three months or even three minutes to adapt: it was on to the new, sensory information straight away. 
I felt exhilarated and on a high. It was tremendous. . . . It felt absolutely incredible” (263). Warwick’s 
experience brings to light questions regarding the cyborg and communication—Is understanding the 
cyborg experience predicated on a new vocabulary? The txt language and the textual, visual, audio, 
and video fragments of the digital interface create new signifiers and new patterns allowing 
individuals new forms for their communication. And admittedly, shared experience would be a step in 
the right direction, but that returns us to questioning how to establish reality. Similarly, how can we 
ascertain the experience of the other half of the cyborg—the machine half?  
Warwick, in the above example, embraces the transgression of boundaries and experiences 
(inhuman) growth. Nevertheless something, perhaps lack of vocabulary, perhaps noise, limits his 
ability to discuss the experience. And what’s the point of being a cyborg if we have no way to talk 
about it?   
 The potential of the cyborg for expanding communication discourse is greater than the 
preliminary overview I have provided here. It does not, at least initially, promise to simplify or clarify 
any of the long-standing issues of communication discourse. On the contrary, the cyborg promises to 
blur the established meanings, realities, authorities, reasoning, arguments, and understanding that 
have, for so long, provided a foundation for critical work. And yet, if, as Stephan Toulmin argues, 
“evolution, not revolution, is the proper model for conceptual change in a discipline” (Bizzell and 
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Herzberg 1411), then the evolution of the cyborg, and its monstrous perspective, foretells of a 
monstrous conceptual change for communication theory.  
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